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In this article, I introduce an approach to the case-study method which is based 
on the work of German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 
Heidegger’s insights have been applied by philosophers and scholars to the 
social and health sciences, and this application has increased noticeably over 
the last decade. This article has been written so that non philosophers may 
benefit from Heidegger’s insights and apply them to their own research and 
practice. I begin with a description and overview of the shift in perspective that 
Heidegger has advocated, and how this shift has turned upside down the fields 
to which it has been applied using formal methods (e.g., object-oriented 
ontology; Harman, 2018). These fields, however, have primarily been 
nonhuman, and reveal the hidden depths of ordinary objects. When considering 
humans, the researcher must search the hidden depths of existence, which 
includes five interrelated components: embodiment, space, time, relatedness, 
and mood. Clear and illustrative examples are provided to demonstrate each of 
these existentials, with one key example drawn on throughout the article.  
 
Keywords: Martin Heidegger, existential phenomenology, phenomenological 





Despite lacking the qualities of generalizability and statistical validity, case studies 
have played an important role in the human sciences. Take psychology as an example. The rod 
that pierced the skull of Phineas Gage first illustrated the subtle but consequential function of 
the frontal cortex and has long served to describe it since (Harlow, 1848). The peculiar psycho-
somatic disturbances and their treatment in Anna O. have introduced to many generations the 
principles of psychoanalysis (Breur & Freud, 1895/1995). And the horrifying education of an 
infant named Albert demonstrated that the behaviorism of American psychologist John Watson 
was more than a neat idea (Watson & Rayner, 1920). 
The importance of case studies in the psychological and medical sciences can be seen 
in the writings of neuropsychiatrist Kurt Goldstein (1963, 2000). Goldstein worked with brain-
injured soldiers during and after World War II. Along with colleague Adhémar Gelb, Goldstein 
carefully examined and described the peculiar behavior of his patients so completely that he 
could anticipate when and how a particular disturbance would occur, such as the in/ability to 
answer a simple question. Goldstein found that the behavioral disturbances in such unique 
cases could be useful in understanding human nature more broadly, because the diversity of 
experiences is narrower in the brain-injured than in the healthy population. French philosopher 
and admirer of the work of Gelb and Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1942/1962), said the 
same of studying individual cases of psychopathology. 
American psychiatrist Arthur Kleinman (1986) has written an insightful collection of 
short case studies through which he demonstrates the difference between disease and illness. 
Patrick Whitehead                           3015 
While these can be differentiated briefly in words—diseases are somatic, and illnesses are 
existential—the concrete examples help illustrate what this difference looks like. 
 
The Promise of Heidegger for Case Study Research 
 
Heidegger’s (1927/2008) contributions to philosophy in the 20th century belong to a 
class of their own. His fundamental ontology was a departure from the slow-going, stepwise 
progression in modern science and philosophy from the 17th century onward. Like the glasses 
resting on the bridge of your nose which you cannot find, Heidegger draws our attention to 
what has been there all along, but we have forgotten is there (“da” literally “here or there”; 
Churchill, 2013): existence. The focus on existence requires a significant and consequential 
shift in focus. What Heidegger calls for in his philosophy is a complete change in understanding 
of what it means to exist—a question that is often left unanswered (if it is asked at all). Human 
living, for example, can be defined medically as the presence of a pulse. For Heidegger, 
however, living cannot be understood by looking at the heart-as-pump. Instead, living is 
revealed in how the heart is used; the beating heart is the setting thanks to which living becomes 
possible. The Heidegger-influenced research looks to the living that was made possible.  
A Heidegger-influenced change in awareness has been summarized in a simple way by 
American philosopher Graham Harman (2018), who looks not at human experience but at 
ordinary objects. Harman translates Heidegger’s cumbersome writings to explain how these 
writings help us understand and avoid problems that come from what Harman calls under-
mining and over-mining. With under-mining, a laboratory scientist assumes that objects are 
best understood by first breaking them down into their smallest parts such as atoms or neurons. 
But the behavior of tiny objects is not always the best way to understand combustion engines 
or elementary school teachers. With overmining, philosophers and scholars frown at the 
thought of getting their hands dirty collecting empirical data, and instead explore the immutable 
truths of the universe by practicing what could be called pure theory. Both approaches—from 
above and below—miss most of what is there. Harman directs philosophers towards the hidden 
depths of the things they encounter, and this direction has most recently transformed art and 
design, most notably architecture (Bedford, 2020; Harman 2019). This way of looking has been 
aimed at everything from office desks and automobiles (Bogost, 2012; Harman, 2002, 2005) 
to entities so large that any attempt to understand them forever changes us (Morton, 2013).  
The purpose of this article is to encourage a similar change in awareness to reveal the 
complexity of human being—specifically as it relates to the social sciences and healthcare. I 
have found a Heideggerian approach helpful in both areas of my research. With psychology, 
Heidegger has been useful in understanding that humans do not have psychological disorders. 
“Disorder” is a general category for personal problems (Whitehead, 2019; Whitehead & Groth, 
2019). The category is useful when psychiatry follows the medical model, which relies on, 
among other things, coding so that insurance companies know when and how to distribute their 
funds. But each instance of depression, anxiety, or autism occurs as a disruption of a person’s 
daily routine. To understand them, it is necessary to understand the person’s daily routine and 
their expectations about life. 
Though Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) philosophy has seen exciting new 
applications to understanding lived experience over the past century (Aho, 2018, 2019; 
Binswanger, 1958; Boss, 1979; Gadamer, 1996; Groth, 2017; Harman, 2002, 2018; Jaspers, 
1963; Whitehead, 2019, 2020a), clumsy translations and a general fear of misunderstanding 
have kept his insights hidden. Because Heidegger is generally categorized as undecipherable, 
and for this reason, left to only the most ambitious scholars and researchers, the reader might 
be surprised to learn that his philosophy focuses on the most basic and ordinary of human 
experiences. These he describes in a way that more closely resembles farmers chatting in a 
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corner tavern than graduate students debating in a university classroom. Heidegger should not 
be reserved for exceptional moments of metaphysical insight, but freely applied to common 
life events, however mundane. And he should certainly be applied to areas that concern health, 
disease, well-being, happiness, and so on—areas examined by researchers in medical and social 
sciences.   
 
A Personal Encounter with Heidegger During a Qualitative Study 
 
I have felt the need for a Heidegger-based case study method in my own research. When 
I began conducting qualitative research, I relied on the formal method based on the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In this method, which was designed by 
psychologist Amedeo Giorgi (2009), researchers divide descriptions of experiences into 
meaning units, divide those units into themes, and examine the themes to determine the 
structure or essence of the experience. I used Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method 
to examine lived experiences in athletes (Senecal & Whitehead, 2018, 2021; Whitehead, 2019; 
Whitehead & Senecal, 2020) and college students (Whitehead & Wright, 2017). The 
methodological guidelines of the descriptive phenomenological method were helpful and held 
me accountable to my data and made sure I had not skimped on any of the steps. Qualitative 
Journal editors and reviewers were also careful to make sure methods had been followed 
correctly. But then my interests shifted from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to 
Heidegger’s existential phenomenology (Whitehead, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Whitehead & Groth, 
2019). This shift in interest became a problem for me during a study I conducted on post-
concussion syndrome (PCS) in athletes of contact sports. One of the participants, who I will 
call Tyrese, had given a tremendous interview. I felt as if I had stepped into Tyrese’s life. I 
could not bring myself to divide his transcript into meaning units, so I abandoned the 
Husserlian method and turned to Heidegger. I did not describe PCS as it had been lived by 
Tyrese. I realized that Husserl was interested in examining the experience whereas Heidegger 
was interested in examining the person. In other words, PCS was not the star of the show. The 
star was my participant, Tyrese, who was a large and hulking former linebacker. I described 
him as they changed over a period of eight years. I described how his relationships changed, 
his focus changed, and his mood changed, and how all these changes led to a significant 
priority-change. It is only later that an observer might look on and call what happened “PCS.”  
There was nothing that prohibited me from using Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology while following the steps of Giorgi’s (2009) Husserlian method but doing so 
seemed to be in bad faith. I would have been binding myself to an established method only to 
satisfy journal editors and reviewers. After all, I was not doing descriptive phenomenology; I 
was doing existential phenomenology of a single participant. 
I began looking for a method based in Heidegger that I could use but found little. 
Hermeneutics and hermeneutic phenomenology, which deal with the kinds of interpreting I 
was doing in my PCS case study, seemed promising. I found the work of Nancy Moules et al. 
(2015) and Max van Manen (2018) who encouraged their readers to employ methods with an 
open mind. Both methods books, however, were careful not to give any guidelines. Reluctance 
to develop a method using Heidegger probably stems from the belief that methods only ever 
get in the way—an argument famously made by Heidegger’s student Hans Georg Gadamer 
(1975/2003).  
But my experience was that there could be a method to applying Heidegger, provided 
the researcher worked with a single case. While the method would not provide ordered steps 
to follow as Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method had done, the case study approach 
would specify what to include and where to look. This is what has motivated my present article. 
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Thinking in Heidegger 
 
A final bit of background is necessary before we can discuss Heidegger’s approach to 
case study methodology. For that, we turn to the process of thinking. For Heidegger (2004), 
there are two types of thinking, which he calls calculative and meditative. By understanding 
the difference between the two, the reader will understand how Heidegger’s approach to 
hospital patients differs from a conventional medical approach. 
Calculative thinking is the kind described by psychologists who use the word 
“cognition.” Synonyms for this kind of thinking may be found in logic, rationality, and 
memorization. These are what Gestalt psychologist, Max Wertheimer (1959), has called 
“reproductive thinking,” which Wertheimer has explained, is not thinking at all. Take logic, 
for example. With logic, a set of steps may be followed to solve a problem. If a problem is 
solved by following the steps, then the soundness of those steps is proven. But it is quite easy 
to demonstrate how this is not thinking. If I give you directions to the university, and following 
them, you arrive at the university, then you will trust that the logic of my directions is sound. 
However, you will not know whether my instructions took you directly to the university, or if 
I had you drive all around town, passing each of my friends’ restaurants and establishments.  
Meditative thinking, by comparison, is an openness to new ideas, insights, and 
intuitions. Heidegger finds in the word, “think,” a common root with “thank.” When thankful, 
we are gracious for what we have received. We cannot be thankful for those things we have 
gone out and taken for ourselves. Consequently, thinking cannot be a procedure for 
apprehending the knowledge of things. Thinking cannot occur if steps are being followed 
mindlessly or carelessly. To think, we must open our awareness. It is as English author, George 
Orwell (1968), has said of writing:  
 
When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you 
want to describe the thing you have been visualizing you probably hunt about 
until you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something 
abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make 
a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do 
the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. (p. 
138) 
 
With thinking, as in writing, one must always be guarded against short-cuts which hide 
meaning rather than bringing it out into the open. Heidegger (1927/2008) explains that we 
cannot describe an experience by following a procedure. There is no paint-by-numbers 
approach for this. Experience can only ever be demonstrated. In writing, this is the adage that 
the writer must show instead of tell.  
During my research with Tyrese, I realized that the phenomenon in question (PCS) 
needed to take a back seat to the person whose life had been transformed due to a series of 
closed-head injuries. The category of disorder comes later, if at all. The point was not that PCS 
caused unusual outbursts of anger or difficulty focusing; the point was that this former football 
player was struggling to keep together the life he had worked so hard to build. By adopting a 
Heideggerian approach, I was free from circling always back to the familiar list of PCS 
symptoms. It would have been little help to ask, “so it was the headaches that made you angry, 
right?” In the Heideggerian analysis, it made more sense that fear was responsible for the anger 
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Applying Heidegger to Case Study Research: How to Do It 
 
As demonstrated with my PCS study, a Heideggerian approach can be applied to an 
existing qualitative method. However, doing so will likely require making substantial changes 
to the method (such as the number of respondents used) and research goal (such as describing 
a single case instead of the eidetic structure of a phenomenon). You might, like me, decide that 
too many alterations to a given qualitative method indicates that you have abandoned the 
method, and it no longer seems fair or honest to explain that you have followed the specific 
method at all. This is where I recommend choosing a case study design, such as one provided 
by Hancock and Algozzine (2016) or Yin (2017), and then using the philosophy of Heidegger 
to inform the processes of interviewing, data analysis, and constructing the narrative. 
Any case study manual can be used as a template. There you will find details about how 
to submit a proposal to an ethical review board, apply for grant funding, research a topic; 
arrange, conduct, and record interviews; and so on. The application of Heidegger’s philosophy 
will occur throughout these steps. 
 
Choosing a Research Question 
 
In research dealing with human subjects, such as occurs in the medical and social 
sciences, the focus is generally on an object. Psychologists study depression, sociologists study 
gender, and physicians study cancer. The focus of each is on a thing—a what. With Heidegger’s 
approach, the focus is on the person—a who. Who is depressed? Who experiences their gender? 
Whose anticipated future and self-image have been transformed by the diagnosis of cancer? 
Heidegger shows us what it means for a person to exist at one moment, such as being a 
72-year-old husband as he’s learning about the tumor in his lungs. Medical sociologists can 
report statistics about how married men 70-80 years-old will generally handle such diagnoses, 
and these can be helpful for making prognoses. Heidegger asks the researcher to do something 
different. He asks them to begin with the 72-year-old husband, even as this man struggles to 
find something to eat that will not make him nauseous. There is more to cancer than an 
abnormal and pathogenic growth of cells. The cancer impacts this man’s identity. This identity 
(or personality), and how it changes, becomes the focus of the Heidegger-influenced case study 
researcher. 
Therefore, if a researcher is interested in applying Heidegger to their case study 
research, then the research question must focus on a person, and not some thing or category 
that this person represents. For example, instead of asking, “What are the effects of medication 
m on the appetite of elderly patients who are undergoing chemotherapy?” the question might 





Once a research participant has been chosen, it is time to hear from them what their 
experience has been. A common method of obtaining this is interviewing. If you are unfamiliar 
with the interviewing process, then I recommend reviewing the manuals on case-study 
research. There you will find advice from planning to transcribing the recordings. But there are 
some changes that you will be encouraged to make if you are interested in applying Heidegger 
to the process. 
When I came into my first PCS interview as the primary investigator, I was armed with 
over a decade of clinical studies, diagnostic criteria, and several case studies on the topic. I 
already had an idea of what to expect. As my interviewee (Tyrese) spoke, I was making a 
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Existence 
checklist of symptoms in my mind. Without realizing it, I was checking to see if Tyrese did, in 
fact, resemble the diagnosis I was hoping to study. When migraines came up, a light went on 
inside my head and I interrupted: “Ooh! Tell me more about that.” I was gathering descriptive 
evidence of PCS. I was using Tyrese. 
Thankfully, Tyrese was unwilling to be used. (Perhaps it was his training as a 
linebacker.) He kept circling back to the parts of his experience that confused him—behaviors 
and feelings that seemed out of the ordinary. He would introduce a story about how he snapped 
at his girlfriend, and I would think “emotional instability/neuroticism.” But he would compare 
this to earlier stories in his life when he had been patient, kind, and caring stories that he felt 
more accurately portrayed his personality. I eventually stopped trying to place him into a 
category, and instead struggled with him to understand the changes that had occurred and were 
occurring. 
It would have been much easier if, from the start, I had had the goal of understanding 
Tyrese. PCS was just a name for a familiar category into which his experiences might be placed. 
But before me was a man who was during change, and this change had presented a problem for 
him. More specifically, had I been following Heidegger’s lead during that interview, I would 
have paid particular attention to five aspects of Tyrese’s experience: his awareness of space, 
time, and body; his relationship to others; and his mood. These are Heidegger’s five 
existentials. They are, for Heidegger, what make humans unique. A summary of these will 
make up the final step for applying Heidegger to case study research.  
 





Analyzing the Interview Transcript 
 
To understand Tyrese through his descriptions of his PCS experience, there is an outline 
that may be followed. The outline is provided by Heidegger’s existentials. When I reviewed 
my conversation with Tyrese, I learned, for example, that he experienced a significant change 
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these results in a significant transformation of personality, so it was understandable that Tyrese 
had trouble in his post-head-injury life. 
In what follows, I provide detailed descriptions of each of Heidegger’s existentials, and 




Space has a familiar definition in modern science. It is presupposed in the definition of 
mass—that is, the amount of space an object takes up. Space is encountered differently in our 
experience. 
When my wife says that her magazine is on the coffee table, she describes a spatial 
relationship between magazine and coffee table. With this description, I am directed to the 
living room where I find that the magazine is merely there on the table. Magazines, however, 
cannot use coffee tables. The coffee table is only useful for human being. Here the coffee table 
is suitable for keeping things from falling to the floor where they would be difficult to reach. 
Magazines do not seek reprieve nor rejoice in their own desirability. They do not exist.  
Humans exist; they use coffee tables as surfaces for propping tired feet or collecting 
magazines. This does not mean that the essence of coffee tables is found in propping up tired 
human feet or collecting magazines, only that it has qualities useful for these purposes. The 
usefulness of the coffee table is revealed through human usage.  
This is but a toe dipped into space as an existential. To go deeper, we must examine 
being-in-the-world, where the essence of space is revealed. 
 
Being-in-the-World. “Being-in-the-world” is one of Heidegger’s many neologisms. It 
is unfortunately common for scholars to use neologisms freely, but without fully understanding 
what they mean. Therefore, I have chosen to take extra time to describe why Heidegger (and 
his translators) have seen fit to form a train with these words. 
Humans are always already in the world, but not in the world the way that coffee is in 
the coffee cup, or the cup is in my office and so on until we have reached the coffee’s placement 
in the world. Humans are not lumps of carbon-based material strewn about the earth. Wherever 
they are, humans are always being. Notice the action implied by the word “being.” In our world 
we are surrounded by familiar things. A couch is not a simple object, but an invitation to relax; 
it is space for resting or ruminating on new case study methods. A couch does not take up space 
in my office the way it might in a dance hall. In my office, a couch creates space for resting 
and working. 
When Heidegger describes existence as being-in-the-world, he has in mind a kind of 
thoughtful regard for the places in which we dwell, and the things that make up these dwellings. 
In my office, I sit comfortably on my couch with my laptop and turn on the lamp above my 
shoulder. To my right is a wine crate turned on its head which is useful for keeping my coffee 
out of the way but within reach, and to my left is a stack of books. This arrangement is mine 
and has been developed over the past decade of sitting for long periods while I work. When 
my wife stops by to tell me about her day, she observes that there is insufficient natural lighting 
for plants, and comments that she does not see how I can spend several hours there each day. 
Notice how in this example my wife and I encounter the same objects but do so in ways that 
reveal unique aspects of ourselves. Before her comment, it had not occurred to me to consider 
my office in terms of its suitability for keeping plants. This is not part of my office-world or 
my world in general. For me, plants are pleasing to look at, but not things to look after or tend 
to. These are part of my wife’s world. There are careful arrangements of plants in front of every 
window in the house, save the windows in my office which get poor sun. (I understand now 
why my wife was so willing to let this room be my office!)  
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We could imagine still another scenario—a visit from my 8-year-old nephew. How will 
he be at home in my office? At first there is the novelty of the couch, the armchair, and the 
thousand or so colorful book-spines. He may strum a few strings on my guitar or thumb through 
a few books, but finding it all unimaginably dull, he would conclude that my office is unsuitable 
for being-eight. 
As objects in physical space arranged by dimensions of length and width, the office is 
identical to me, my wife, and my nephew. As things in existential space, however, we find 
dimensions of ourselves. 
Space did not present as a substantial problem for Tyrese, but that does not mean that 
his awareness of certain spaces did not change. Following concussions, for example, the 
weight-room was transformed from a comfortable and inviting space to an uncomfortable and 
foreboding one. Other interviewees from the PCS study described feelings of vertigo when 




Given that Heidegger’s (1927/2008) most substantial contribution was titled Being and 
Time, it is obvious that time plays an important role for him. Time, however, only makes sense 
through human existence. While stop watches and clocks count minutes and seconds, time can 
only be found in humans.  
As it is measured by a watch, time is a standardized unit of duration. While useful for 
describing and explaining objects in science, this formulation of time has already been 
abstracted out of and away from where it emerges in humans. Time is only ever “time for…” 
(fill in the blank). By itself, “five minutes” does not mean anything; it is insignificant or 
irrelevant. Five minutes is scarcely enough time to prepare eggs, but it might be more than 
enough time to give directions to the university. Having too much time (boredom) or too little 
time (anxiety) is a consequence not of the discrete duration (time for what?), but of the horizon 
of meaning upon which time is being lived (see Aho, 2008, 2019, for a discussion of the 
temporal quality of mood disorders). I experience six months as too little time when I wish to 
have already published a book, but too long a time to wait for a vacation. 
Humans always exist in a three-fold temporal structure of past, present, and future. 
Students enter their introductory psychology courses with some knowledge of the field, even 
if that knowledge consists primarily of misconceptions (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009). Students 
still have some idea of what to expect in the classroom and how it will be different from high 
school. These describe the past, which they bring along. Each student brings a world into the 
room—that is to say, each student where they are. The students are also directed towards 
futures which often have to do with getting the celebrated college degree and leveraging it for 
an impressive job. The past they bring along and the future horizon towards which they work 
converge upon and give meaning to attending class in the present. 
Time extends to all aspects of experience. In thinking, there is the knowledge brought 
(past), that which is sought after (future), and thinking (present). In research, there is the a 
priori (past), the answer being sought after (future), and the collection and analysis of data or 
case studies (present).  
For Tyrese, linear passage of time began to break down. This occurred in predictable 
ways following serious concussions where he blacked out for a period. He would learn 
afterwards that he was behaving normally, even though he did not remember anything in the 
hours following the injury. As Tyrese accumulated more and more concussions, he began 
losing periods of time throughout the day, even when these periods did not immediately follow 
a head-injury. He described returning from school (high school) one day and being unable to 
remember anything that happened in his classes. The routines that Tyrese had relied on were 
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still in place, but they were no longer useful to him. What good is it to remember to stop at the 
grocery store on the way home from work when you do not remember why you needed to? 




We see already that being-in-the-world also means being-in-time. To this we may now 
add being-with-Others. We are wrapped up in social relations which shape our existence. When 
I write a research report, I do not address it to a journal but to the journal’s audience. I write 
for the editor who is a friend and for my colleagues and supervisors who will be evaluating me 
for promotion. My writing style and focus have been shaped by Others who have served as 
mentors or have gripped me with their words.  
When walking through the grocery store, I am a customer and view the uniformed 
employees as there on my behalf, willing to help me locate the garam masala. As a sales 
associate, this person is patient with my ignorance and my requests for their help. As a 
customer, I am willing to be led across the grocery store by a young person.   
When the salesperson asks about an upcoming exam, for a moment I am bewildered. 
The words have been enunciated clearly, but they seem somehow out of place. My relationship 
to the salesperson collapses. I am armed with a recipe for curry, not course information. Our 
relationship is transformed from customer-grocer to teacher-student. I am torn from the 
occupation as spice-seeker and become instructor, reflecting on a course assignment schedule. 
In this moment, the horizon of dinner plans recedes and is replaced by the horizon of the four-
month semester. So, too, does the space of our interaction change. The width of the store aisles 
is useful for the navigating grocery carts, but less so for answering private questions about 
grades. 
Our existence changes based on the social contexts in which we find ourselves. Upon 
the horizon of relatedness, space and time are lived differently. I might be giving a lecture on 
Gestalt theory to 40 students in a classroom when the computer freezes. Immediately I decide 
to reboot the computer without stopping the lecture and go to the white board to draw the next 
figure to demonstrate the principle of continuity. All of this occurs to a sea of deadpan faces 
from which I gather that the students would rather be watching television. This goes on until 
the computer is back up and running, and I can return to the pre-selected figures which are 
helpful when it comes to teaching Gestalt principles. Now if the same were to occur in a 
classroom of 40 potential colleagues who were there to evaluate me for a job or fellowship, 
then the common technological hiccup would be devastating. Instead of rebooting the 
computer, I paralyze myself in indecision, scanning my memory for an alternative example or 
searching the room for something that demonstrates continuity. Here I imagine that the deadpan 
faces betray disinterest in me as a prospective employee or fellow.  
Both settings are objectively identical, right down to the 40 bodies seated about the 
classroom. But they are not merely bodies, but Others who exist, and who place demands on 
me. The quality of existence changes everything.  
I can choose to ignore another passenger on the elevator. I do this by deliberately 
looking away from them or shifting my body so as not to indicate interest. I cannot do this with 
the elevator walls or ceiling. When I ignore a note left by my wife on the kitchen counter, it is 
not a slip of paper I ignore, but the directive of my wife. 
While being-with is particularly apparent during social interactions, this existential 
structure may also be found in isolation of others—such as when writing an essay alone in my 
office or running alone on a trail. I cannot write anonymously but must always take up a 
particular and personal vantage point. Even when authoring an anonymous review on a website, 
I write as a consumer with all the presumed rights and privileges that pertain. My writing is 
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(hopefully) suitable for a particular audience, and my running activity is motivated out of an 
interest in being validated (by Others) for my fitness or as preparation for a competition (against 
Others).  
In my interview with Tyrese, it was clear that problems in his personal relationships 
played a significant role in his PCS problem. Over the years, he increasingly felt as though he 
was unable to be himself around his partners. After a few instances where he surprised himself 
with angry outbursts, he began taking time away counting to 10, walking away, and so on. 
When these brief periods were no longer enough, he had to take breaks from his relationships. 
This led to more and more social isolation, which placed a greater demand on Tyrese’s 
relationships with fellow football players and coaches. It was not surprising to learn that new 




My wife and I have adopted an eight-week-old puppy who has made it her mission to 
claim each room in the house. Ten minutes ago, she came to a rare stop and collapsed in the 
middle of the living room floor. I carefully opened my laptop and began revising a paragraph 
I had written earlier that morning. Alerted by commotion in another corner of the house, the 
puppy bolted up and out of the living room, followed by me. She found my slipper and began 
chewing on it. Despite knowledge that anger is confusing to dogs, I aggressively yanked it from 
her mouth.  
If you had pressed me, then I would have tried to explain that this puppy had made me 
angry. But doing so would have been misleading. Puppies get into trouble. Playful 
troublemaking belongs to the world of owning puppies. What I found in her activity, however, 
was frustration. To understand this, we must resist the a causes b formulation. When I began 
hurriedly revising my paper, I was not attuned to playful troublemaking of puppies. I was 
resentful of my duties as puppy-parent and tried to shirk these to write. I was also frustrated 
that my words did not sparkle like those of William James. It was upon these horizons of 
resentment and frustration that my response to the puppy could be understood. Following her 
into the hallway, I was receptive to frustrating things—a restless puppy and chewed up slippers. 
In short, I was already in a frustrated mood, and saw in everything its capacity for frustration.  
If my mood had been one of playfulness, then I would have been delighted when she 
sprang from her nap and would have laughed at the foolishness of having left my slippers out 
for a teething puppy. Humans do not simply have emotions. They exist through their moods. 
A hazardous morning commute does not give stress and a poor exam does not make one feel 
like a failure. In each, a person brings with them a particular kind of mood through which their 
experience is interpreted. 
What stood out to Tyrese as a mood-related problem was not despair or loneliness; 
Tyrese was concerned about his anger on the football field. He realized that he was no longer 
a sportsman in competition with others, upholding the integrity of a sport he dominated. Tyrese 
wanted to kill his opponents. He wanted to hit the running back so hard that they would not be 
able to stand up. The spirit of the game had been replaced with anger, and that was not the kind 
of football player he admired. It was not the kind of player he wanted to be.  
In the analysis, it was impossible to view Tyrese’s anger outside the context of his fear 
that the next play could be his last. He was playing with a lingering uncertainty about his future. 
Playing at the highest level of competition requires athletes to be able to give all of themselves. 
This is difficult for athletes returning from injury, even when their bodies have completely 
recovered, because there remains the fear of the career-ending play. Physiologically, fear and 
anger share much in common. Therefore, it is easy to misinterpret fear in dogs as aggressive 
behavior. Anger was easier than fear to reconcile with his identity as a linebacker. 
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Embodiment 
 
In modern science, objects are considered real only when they take up space (i.e., when 
they have matter). It is through possession of a body that humans are understood to be real, and 
this is how human experience is generally handled by the tools of modern science. Seeing is 
explained by photoreceptors, and touching is explained by corpuscles. Even non-material 
things are presumed to have a sort of materiality: we see sights, hear sounds, and feel textures 
(see James, 1904). But a sight cannot be seen outside of seeing any more than a bucket can be 
said to hold a river (James, 1890). 
Our bodies are the ground upon which we encounter things in our world (Boss, 1979; 
Condrau, 1988). The eyes do not capture sights or cause seeing, but it is through the eyes (and 
the rest of our body) that we see. When blindfolded, the steps from my bedside to the bathroom 
suddenly become uncertain. I bump into the bed frame and begin searching for the bathroom 
doorway well before I have reached it. The objective distances between the things in my 
bedroom have not changed, but I experience my bed, dresser, and sleeping dog as swollen in 
size, as if they were suddenly eager to be bumped into or stepped on. 
At the home improvement store, I size up the bags of concrete-mix from the perspective 
I have in my body. If already sore from digging post-holes, the 80-lb bags will look bigger and 
heavier than when I am well-rested and spry. Objects cannot touch one another. They can bump 
up against or fall onto one another but cannot reach out or touch. Touching is communicative. 
Gerontologists, for example, describe the importance of communicative touching when it 
comes to elder care (Erikson & Erikson, 1998). Human bodies can be treated like objects, wiped 
down the way you might wipe down a kitchen counter. This is inadvisable for the treatment of 
elders, who can also be looked after and cared for. It is also through my body that I hold my 
wife or wave hello to a passing neighbor.  
The nervous system has been a popular focus for inquiry across the behavioral, social, 
and biological sciences. Even phenomenology (Varela, 1996) and existentialism (Caruso & 
Flanagan, 2018) have been paired together with the nervous system. But as we have seen 
already, behind the phenomenon there is essentially nothing. We will get essentially nowhere 
with an explanation that experience is caused by the nervous system. Mixing existence with 
neuroscience is like mixing red and hard; nothing will come of it (Heidegger, 2001; Whitehead, 
2020b). 
You might be surprised that embodiment is missing from my analysis with Tyrese. 
After all, I was studying concussions—and concussions happen to the brain. Of course, 
Tyrese’s body was affected by all his concussions, but he did not experience his body as 
breaking down. Even during recovery following his injures, Tyrese continued lifting weights 
and training with the team during practices without pads. It was strange to him that he felt 
normal yet was still unable to give himself completely to his sport (even when the team doctor 
gave him the green light).  
Then, of course, there are the headaches, which must occur in the head, right? What 
stood out to Tyrese was not the pain, although pain was a factor. Tyrese was unable to focus. 
He was unable to relax, and unable to sleep. His coping strategies—smart phone, television, 





Tyrese’s story was a happy one. He was surprised to find support from his friends and 
mentors even after retiring from football. He took time off from continuing his studies and 
began working full-time selling football apparel and equipment—tying his pre-injury 
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personality to his post-injury personality, which is an important part of rehabilitation. Tyrese 
made new friends outside of football, which was something he had not previously thought 
possible. When I interviewed him, Tyrese was already thinking about offering workshops to 
college and professional football players who had been sidelined by head-injuries. 
By itself, the story of Tyrese is as uplifting as it is informative. Any case study approach 
would be capable of demonstrating this. But where the Heideggerian approach really shines is 
in how it captures the way Tyrese encountered his injury. PCS is in a state of medical confusion. 
It has been struck from the DSM-5 (American Psychological Association, 2013), yet remains 
in the ICD-11 (World Health Organization, 2018). The National Collegiate Athletics 
Association is divided about whether it is a problem. In other words, it is unpredictable what 
sort of help Tyrese would be offered by sports medicine or psychiatry. But, after looking at his 
case through the lens of Heidegger’s existentialism, the problems are not only clear—their 
solutions are clear, too. 
Changes to personality occur because of development, injury and illness, and even 
occupational change. Changes can be seen to my own personality as a qualitative researcher 
throughout studies such as this one, where my approach to participants, interviews, and 
analyses undergoes a change considerable enough to require a change in methodology. 
Tyrese’s case can be viewed the same way. We already know that the most significant changes 
occurred with respect to his relatedness, mood, and awareness of time. A course of treatment 
would need to focus on each. With relationships, for example, Tyrese would need to adjust his 
expectations. He wishes to be calm and level-headed, but that has changed. This does not mean 
that Tyrese must make himself at home with angry outbursts, of course. It means that he must 
accept that there are certain situations that he must take care to avoid. This is the case with 
anybody. We build a life for ourselves that emphasizes our strengths and minimizes or hides 
our weaknesses. There is trouble when we have a misguided view of who we are or what we 
can handle. 
The approach I have described is not a stand-alone method but may be applied to 
existing methods if the researcher is interested in shining a light on the human person. This is 
particularly important for those fields where the bright light of modernity has cast a shadow 
over entire regions of human being such as in the field of clinical psychology, which has 
increasingly become committed to the neurobiology of psychological suffering (Aho, 2019; 
American Psychological Association, 2013; Kinderman, 2019). Detailed examples of this can 
be found in Médard Boss (1979) and Kevin Aho (2019) for psychiatry and clinical psychology; 
Gion Condrau (1988) or Miles Groth (2017) for psychotherapy; Hans-Georg Gadamer (1996), 
Kevin Aho (2018) or Arthur Kleinman (1986) for medicine; and my own work (Whitehead, 
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